Wavell Room Audio Reads

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  • An improved audio format version of our written content. Get your defence and security perspectives now through this podcast.
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Political Science Politics & Government
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Episodes
  • Reworking the strategy of strategic communication

    Reworking the strategy of strategic communication
    Feb 19 2025
    "Achieving information dominance is an indispensable prerequisite of combat action."
    Editor's note: This style of article is also a move from our more traditional analytical articles. However, we valued the first person experience it offers and think it is of interest to our readers.
    The current Labour government is having a hard time of it from mainstream media and with the departure of Sue Gray as the Chief of Staff at Downing Street and a budget that already seems to be unpopular. Downing Street it is going to have to work hard to reverse what has been an unsteady number of weeks in the headlines.
    How can it do this and why?
    I have recently returned from Operation ORBITAL (the UK presence in Eastern Europe) as the media officer. During this time I was fortunate enough to work alongside Task Force Thunder in Grafenwoehr. I saw multiple elements of the NATO effort to support Ukraine from a J4, J7 and J9 perspective. Whether that be helicopter pilot training to medical serials, the state of the art facilities being used, or witnessing the biggest movement of kit and equipment across Europe since WW2. The effort from every nation and individual involved is staggering.
    But it seems that absolutely no one outside of military circles is aware of it.
    When on rest and relaxation I attended two weddings. When chatting to fellow guests I was often asked, 'Is there still a war going on?' Why has everyone forgotten about the conflict in the Ukraine? It would be very easy to blame the 24-hour news cycle and the constant demand for new stories and viewer fatigue for the war falling down the priority list in newsrooms. I would argue, however, that poor strategic communications has also diminished understanding and interest in the conflict.
    This opinion piece is focussing on strategic communications and not strategic command.
    Finding the equation
    When discussing the Labour Government Tony Blair's former spin doctor, Alastair Campbell, offered a solution in the New European. Campbell offered "strategic communications, which is the simultaneous development, execution and narration of the driving strategy of government." Campbell provides a solid definition of strategic communications and one we can work with, "create narratives, deliver narratives and sell the story."
    But how do we do it?
    A simple strategy model that I have used before is one developed by Arthur F. Lykke Jr who gives us the ends, ways, and means model. Many officers will be familiar with this 3-tier framework. The formula is simple: strategy = ends + ways + means.
    This gives us three simple questions to ask; What is the desired end-state? How can it be achieved? What resources are required?
    The strategic communications strategy for the war in Ukraine has a well-defined end state which is to ensure continued support form the UK public for the work being done by NATO and the UK Armed Forces. The strategic talking points and lines to take are comprehensively circulated and updated as needed. We have the ways in which we wish to do this, whether that be a certain number of views, shares or likes on social media posts, headlines or column inches in traditional print, content creation from interviews and documentary series (I highly recommend watching the INTERFLEX series on YoutTube that was created by BFBS) all underpinned by narratives we design.
    Where we come unstuck is the means. What resources are required to do this?
    I will offer a sports analogy to help explain this. What do all premier league football teams want to do? Win the league.
    I accept that small clubs merely wish to survive and some mid-table clubs just want to turn a profit. I am being reductive for simplicity. We have our end state: win the league.
    The ways are the styles of football a team or how the team coach wishes to play. Some teams want a high press and to counterattack: traditionally in England we have played a long ball attritional style with passes limited to between 6-8 from goalkeeper to a strong ...
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    10 mins
  • The state we are in - British Army decline

    The state we are in - British Army decline
    Feb 14 2025
    General Sanders was evidently as blunt as he felt he could be in his valedictory communication when standing down as Chief of the General Staff (CGS). From day 1 of his appointment he was publicly candid about the size of the Army, which did not sit well with the Secretary of State for Defence; it is well known that even exceptional politicians find it difficult to cope with inconvenient truths. Nevertheless, Wallace was considered one of our better politicians. I still wonder why the shining star that was Wallace faded so quickly. I do hope there is not an unedifying explanation.
    Sanders' assessment of British Army decline was as explicit as he dared to be but full of implicit warnings that will be lost on most people. He was absolutely right to make the case to re-arm as fast as we can (a huge challenge given our sclerotic acquisition processes). What was left largely unsaid is the inability of the Army to prepare, deploy and sustain itself in the field.
    During the Cold War, when we used to spend around 6% of GDP on Defence, the Army had four deployable Divisions, that exercised as a Corps within NATO. In the same era, 'Stables' parades were a feature of unit life whereby vehicles were taken out of their garages and cleaned, repaired and maintained. Detachment, vehicle or Crew Commanders and their associated personnel became very knowledgeable about the state of their vehicles; knew their strengths, weaknesses and idiosyncrasies. Understandably, a bond was formed with the vehicle platform that was to bear these personnel into and/or in battle. Being so in touch with key equipment heightened the chance of success in combat; the like of which has been torpedoed by something called Whole Fleet Management (WFM), arguably one of the most destructive policies ever implemented.
    The bulk of vehicles and equipment are no longer in unit lines, but held centrally (and certainly not enough to equip a comprehensive mobilisation) and 'maintained'. With the bonds of ownership broken, prior to an exercise (or Operation), vehicles and equipment are delivered from a central pool, quite often not on time or in a good state, and preparation/repair/familiarisation eats into valuable training time. Worse still, a paucity of military vehicles is often offset by civilian rental vehicles, which detracts from training and credibility still further, and some exercises would in all likelihood fail completely if personal mobile phones were not used; which tells you more about the Army's communications systems than it does about poor signals security behaviour. Whilst WFM may make sense to accountants, it has destroyed the crucial link of familiarity between operator and vehicle platform and signals equipment, that is likely to make a difference in the crucible of combat.
    Even if there were sufficient numbers of vehicles, there is a NATO-wide critical lack of strategic and operational lift capacity, whether that be air, maritime, rail or by road, to get them to the right place on time.
    Back in the 80s the British Army had over 1,000 Main Battle Tanks (MBT). On the books today there are 200 or so. I would risk a lot of money in betting that only about 100 are actually fully serviceable.
    As Sanders asked when he became CGS: why would he want to reduce the size of the Army in these turbulent times? Re-arming is one thing. Increasing the size of the Army is quite another. The rot set in with the demise of the Junior Army back in the 90s, compounded, amongst other things, by a disastrous privatisation of the recruiting function. Units are much reduced in size in terms of personnel. The persistent reduction of "our most important asset"1 necessitates the Army policy direction for new capability programmes to aim for personnel levels of less than the current level or at worst: no more. The reality is that many new capabilities will require greater personnel levels than currently, particularly if the Army is to double and then triple its capability. Even if t...
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    9 mins
  • Hooper Prize - Third Place: Falklands Analysed.

    Hooper Prize - Third Place: Falklands Analysed.
    Feb 11 2025
    Third Place (Joint)
    LH(EW) Lewis Batch, Northwood HQ
    It is more than 40 years since the Falklands conflict. Evaluate the challenges the Royal Navy face if it was to engage in a non-UN/NATO supported conflict in the Southern hemisphere.
    Context
    On 05 April 1982 the aircraft carriers HMS HERMES, HMS INVINCIBLE and their escort vessels, sailed from Portsmouth for the South Atlantic as part of the UK governments response to the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands. Then, as would apply now, the UK was not afforded protection under NATO's Article 5 'collective self-defence' (valid only for territories north of the Tropic of Cancer) and a solely British Military operation was initiated. Given the need to carry an invasion force over some 8,000 miles, the Royal Navy (RN) was to act as the main military apparatus in the transportation of the invasion force south: this was codenamed OPERATION CORPORATE.
    Forty-one years later and Argentina has elected a new president in Javier Milie, who is keen to re-open questions over the future of the Falklands sovereignty. This, coupled with the RN's recovery from a period of austerity-driven defence cuts, provides comparisons which are eerily reminiscent of the state of the RN in 1982. It is therefore appropriate to discuss whether the RN in 2024 could replicate a similar response to that that was launched in 1982.
    To make fair assessment, the following areas will be discussed: political appetite (and foreign policy), fleet size, technology, defence procurement, as well as the UK's relationship with her allies and the role of overseas bases.
    Political Appetite
    The UK government does and continues to demonstrate its desire to play a global role, meeting its commitment to international partners and defending peace and stability. This is evident from the UK's leading role in both the training and delivery of equipment to Ukraine since 2022; the commitment through OPERATION PROSPERITY GUARDIAN to ensure freedom of navigation through areas littoral to Yemen; notwithstanding swift responses to the 2021 Kabul Airlift, the evacuation of UK nationals from Sudan in 2023 and most recently, the delivery of humanitarian aid to Gaza.
    Importantly, it was the release of the 2021 Integrated Review and Defence Command Paper which reiterated the appetite for 'global Britain'. This manifested itself in a commitment to respond to both concurrent and new and emerging threats, focussing largely on the following methods: the need for a more forward based Navy, the ability to deploy one functioning aircraft carrier and investment in future technology, such a direct energy weapons and artificial intelligence.
    In short, the UK has demonstrated it maintains the political will to remain a global power in protecting its interests at home and abroad. However, this has been conducted with ever stretching resources, most notably, fewer available capital ships and a creaking support structure.
    Fleet Size
    With it established that the UK has the political will power to react to a theoretical conflict in the southern hemisphere, the next area of discussion lays with the current RN footprint and whether there is appropriate number of capital ships, auxiliary ships and supply chain to support extended deployment at high readiness.
    If we compare the current RN fleet with that of the task force sent in 1982, we can see numbers are significantly lower and this has continued to decrease in size.
    The OPERATION CORPORATE task group comprised of 127 ships: 43 RN vessels, (2 aircraft carriers, 15 frigates, 6 destroyers, 2 LPD's and 6 submarines), 24 Sea Harrier and 22 Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA). The 62 merchant vessels were British-registered vessels requisitioned by the Ministry of Defence (MoD), otherwise known as 'Ships Taken Up From Trade' (STUFT).
    In contrast, the current RN in its totality encompasses 66 vessels, drastically reducing to 21 when listing only capital ships:11 frigates, 6 destroyers, 2 aircraft carriers, 2 LPDs an...
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    13 mins

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