• Reworking the strategy of strategic communication
    Feb 19 2025
    "Achieving information dominance is an indispensable prerequisite of combat action."
    Editor's note: This style of article is also a move from our more traditional analytical articles. However, we valued the first person experience it offers and think it is of interest to our readers.
    The current Labour government is having a hard time of it from mainstream media and with the departure of Sue Gray as the Chief of Staff at Downing Street and a budget that already seems to be unpopular. Downing Street it is going to have to work hard to reverse what has been an unsteady number of weeks in the headlines.
    How can it do this and why?
    I have recently returned from Operation ORBITAL (the UK presence in Eastern Europe) as the media officer. During this time I was fortunate enough to work alongside Task Force Thunder in Grafenwoehr. I saw multiple elements of the NATO effort to support Ukraine from a J4, J7 and J9 perspective. Whether that be helicopter pilot training to medical serials, the state of the art facilities being used, or witnessing the biggest movement of kit and equipment across Europe since WW2. The effort from every nation and individual involved is staggering.
    But it seems that absolutely no one outside of military circles is aware of it.
    When on rest and relaxation I attended two weddings. When chatting to fellow guests I was often asked, 'Is there still a war going on?' Why has everyone forgotten about the conflict in the Ukraine? It would be very easy to blame the 24-hour news cycle and the constant demand for new stories and viewer fatigue for the war falling down the priority list in newsrooms. I would argue, however, that poor strategic communications has also diminished understanding and interest in the conflict.
    This opinion piece is focussing on strategic communications and not strategic command.
    Finding the equation
    When discussing the Labour Government Tony Blair's former spin doctor, Alastair Campbell, offered a solution in the New European. Campbell offered "strategic communications, which is the simultaneous development, execution and narration of the driving strategy of government." Campbell provides a solid definition of strategic communications and one we can work with, "create narratives, deliver narratives and sell the story."
    But how do we do it?
    A simple strategy model that I have used before is one developed by Arthur F. Lykke Jr who gives us the ends, ways, and means model. Many officers will be familiar with this 3-tier framework. The formula is simple: strategy = ends + ways + means.
    This gives us three simple questions to ask; What is the desired end-state? How can it be achieved? What resources are required?
    The strategic communications strategy for the war in Ukraine has a well-defined end state which is to ensure continued support form the UK public for the work being done by NATO and the UK Armed Forces. The strategic talking points and lines to take are comprehensively circulated and updated as needed. We have the ways in which we wish to do this, whether that be a certain number of views, shares or likes on social media posts, headlines or column inches in traditional print, content creation from interviews and documentary series (I highly recommend watching the INTERFLEX series on YoutTube that was created by BFBS) all underpinned by narratives we design.
    Where we come unstuck is the means. What resources are required to do this?
    I will offer a sports analogy to help explain this. What do all premier league football teams want to do? Win the league.
    I accept that small clubs merely wish to survive and some mid-table clubs just want to turn a profit. I am being reductive for simplicity. We have our end state: win the league.
    The ways are the styles of football a team or how the team coach wishes to play. Some teams want a high press and to counterattack: traditionally in England we have played a long ball attritional style with passes limited to between 6-8 from goalkeeper to a strong ...
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    10 mins
  • The state we are in - British Army decline
    Feb 14 2025
    General Sanders was evidently as blunt as he felt he could be in his valedictory communication when standing down as Chief of the General Staff (CGS). From day 1 of his appointment he was publicly candid about the size of the Army, which did not sit well with the Secretary of State for Defence; it is well known that even exceptional politicians find it difficult to cope with inconvenient truths. Nevertheless, Wallace was considered one of our better politicians. I still wonder why the shining star that was Wallace faded so quickly. I do hope there is not an unedifying explanation.
    Sanders' assessment of British Army decline was as explicit as he dared to be but full of implicit warnings that will be lost on most people. He was absolutely right to make the case to re-arm as fast as we can (a huge challenge given our sclerotic acquisition processes). What was left largely unsaid is the inability of the Army to prepare, deploy and sustain itself in the field.
    During the Cold War, when we used to spend around 6% of GDP on Defence, the Army had four deployable Divisions, that exercised as a Corps within NATO. In the same era, 'Stables' parades were a feature of unit life whereby vehicles were taken out of their garages and cleaned, repaired and maintained. Detachment, vehicle or Crew Commanders and their associated personnel became very knowledgeable about the state of their vehicles; knew their strengths, weaknesses and idiosyncrasies. Understandably, a bond was formed with the vehicle platform that was to bear these personnel into and/or in battle. Being so in touch with key equipment heightened the chance of success in combat; the like of which has been torpedoed by something called Whole Fleet Management (WFM), arguably one of the most destructive policies ever implemented.
    The bulk of vehicles and equipment are no longer in unit lines, but held centrally (and certainly not enough to equip a comprehensive mobilisation) and 'maintained'. With the bonds of ownership broken, prior to an exercise (or Operation), vehicles and equipment are delivered from a central pool, quite often not on time or in a good state, and preparation/repair/familiarisation eats into valuable training time. Worse still, a paucity of military vehicles is often offset by civilian rental vehicles, which detracts from training and credibility still further, and some exercises would in all likelihood fail completely if personal mobile phones were not used; which tells you more about the Army's communications systems than it does about poor signals security behaviour. Whilst WFM may make sense to accountants, it has destroyed the crucial link of familiarity between operator and vehicle platform and signals equipment, that is likely to make a difference in the crucible of combat.
    Even if there were sufficient numbers of vehicles, there is a NATO-wide critical lack of strategic and operational lift capacity, whether that be air, maritime, rail or by road, to get them to the right place on time.
    Back in the 80s the British Army had over 1,000 Main Battle Tanks (MBT). On the books today there are 200 or so. I would risk a lot of money in betting that only about 100 are actually fully serviceable.
    As Sanders asked when he became CGS: why would he want to reduce the size of the Army in these turbulent times? Re-arming is one thing. Increasing the size of the Army is quite another. The rot set in with the demise of the Junior Army back in the 90s, compounded, amongst other things, by a disastrous privatisation of the recruiting function. Units are much reduced in size in terms of personnel. The persistent reduction of "our most important asset"1 necessitates the Army policy direction for new capability programmes to aim for personnel levels of less than the current level or at worst: no more. The reality is that many new capabilities will require greater personnel levels than currently, particularly if the Army is to double and then triple its capability. Even if t...
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    9 mins
  • Hooper Prize - Third Place: Falklands Analysed.
    Feb 11 2025
    Third Place (Joint)
    LH(EW) Lewis Batch, Northwood HQ
    It is more than 40 years since the Falklands conflict. Evaluate the challenges the Royal Navy face if it was to engage in a non-UN/NATO supported conflict in the Southern hemisphere.
    Context
    On 05 April 1982 the aircraft carriers HMS HERMES, HMS INVINCIBLE and their escort vessels, sailed from Portsmouth for the South Atlantic as part of the UK governments response to the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands. Then, as would apply now, the UK was not afforded protection under NATO's Article 5 'collective self-defence' (valid only for territories north of the Tropic of Cancer) and a solely British Military operation was initiated. Given the need to carry an invasion force over some 8,000 miles, the Royal Navy (RN) was to act as the main military apparatus in the transportation of the invasion force south: this was codenamed OPERATION CORPORATE.
    Forty-one years later and Argentina has elected a new president in Javier Milie, who is keen to re-open questions over the future of the Falklands sovereignty. This, coupled with the RN's recovery from a period of austerity-driven defence cuts, provides comparisons which are eerily reminiscent of the state of the RN in 1982. It is therefore appropriate to discuss whether the RN in 2024 could replicate a similar response to that that was launched in 1982.
    To make fair assessment, the following areas will be discussed: political appetite (and foreign policy), fleet size, technology, defence procurement, as well as the UK's relationship with her allies and the role of overseas bases.
    Political Appetite
    The UK government does and continues to demonstrate its desire to play a global role, meeting its commitment to international partners and defending peace and stability. This is evident from the UK's leading role in both the training and delivery of equipment to Ukraine since 2022; the commitment through OPERATION PROSPERITY GUARDIAN to ensure freedom of navigation through areas littoral to Yemen; notwithstanding swift responses to the 2021 Kabul Airlift, the evacuation of UK nationals from Sudan in 2023 and most recently, the delivery of humanitarian aid to Gaza.
    Importantly, it was the release of the 2021 Integrated Review and Defence Command Paper which reiterated the appetite for 'global Britain'. This manifested itself in a commitment to respond to both concurrent and new and emerging threats, focussing largely on the following methods: the need for a more forward based Navy, the ability to deploy one functioning aircraft carrier and investment in future technology, such a direct energy weapons and artificial intelligence.
    In short, the UK has demonstrated it maintains the political will to remain a global power in protecting its interests at home and abroad. However, this has been conducted with ever stretching resources, most notably, fewer available capital ships and a creaking support structure.
    Fleet Size
    With it established that the UK has the political will power to react to a theoretical conflict in the southern hemisphere, the next area of discussion lays with the current RN footprint and whether there is appropriate number of capital ships, auxiliary ships and supply chain to support extended deployment at high readiness.
    If we compare the current RN fleet with that of the task force sent in 1982, we can see numbers are significantly lower and this has continued to decrease in size.
    The OPERATION CORPORATE task group comprised of 127 ships: 43 RN vessels, (2 aircraft carriers, 15 frigates, 6 destroyers, 2 LPD's and 6 submarines), 24 Sea Harrier and 22 Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA). The 62 merchant vessels were British-registered vessels requisitioned by the Ministry of Defence (MoD), otherwise known as 'Ships Taken Up From Trade' (STUFT).
    In contrast, the current RN in its totality encompasses 66 vessels, drastically reducing to 21 when listing only capital ships:11 frigates, 6 destroyers, 2 aircraft carriers, 2 LPDs an...
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    13 mins
  • Hooper Prize - Third Place: Royal Navy Future Challenges
    Feb 7 2025
    Third Place (Joint)
    AB David Dulla, HMS TAMAR
    It is more than 40 years since the Falklands conflict. Evaluate the challenges the Royal Navy face if it were to engage in a non-NATO supported conflict in the Southern Hemisphere
    Context and Considerations
    Argentina surrendered their claim on the British overseas territory 74 days after invading the Falkland Islands, an outcome determined by poor strategic planning coupled with an under estimation of the United Kingdom's political appetite for a military response. Using this short war as the sole benchmark for predicting future challenges for the Royal Navy is unreliable over 40 years later, however this essay argues the same four considerations still determine the scale and success of any scenario in the future. Political, social, environmental and economic factors drive the capabilities of everyone from the Prime Minister down to a tradesman running a small painting and decorating business, with all organisations subject to conditions of which they have limited levels of control. Challenges vary depending on these factors, but conclusions will highlight financial investments, determined by social and political support, will create risks for the Royal Navy.
    A turbulent world outlook and the NATO perspective
    Politically the United Kingdom is largely divided in 2024 between the Conservative and the Labour parties. The UK have led support for Ukraine in their ongoing defence when the Russian Federation invaded in February 2022, fuelling a deterioration in East-West relations which is comparable to the Cold War 1947-1991. Meanwhile, Israel invaded Palestinian Gaza in October 2023 after responding to a Hamas attack on a music festival, following years of unrest over territorial claims traced back to political agreements made in the wake of World War II. In addition, Yemen has seen the Iranian backed Houthis carry out attacks on western merchant ships attempting to transit the Red Sea. And finally, the People's Republic of China is attempting to assert dominance in the South China Sea, with the deployment of Royal Navy and NATO allies to safeguard free trade and fisheries.
    With these significant and potentially escalating conflicts dominating politics, focusing on the northern hemisphere is the key focus for UK governments. This prioritisation means deploying less operational capability south of the equator, arguably challenging the speed at which the Royal Navy's main fighting force could respond in these areas.
    Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty stipulates an attack on British overseas territory south of the Tropic of Cancer would not qualify for collective defence between NATO Nations, and as seen in the Iraq War 2003 it is easier to make a political argument for military conflict when you are supported by other countries because resources and risks are shared. With no weapons of mass destruction found during the Iraq campaign, and 179 UK military personal losing their lives, the conflict and consequent enquiry conducted in 2016 concluded a deficient case for war where preparations were inadequate and military objectives failed. Tony Blair, the Prime Minister during the conflict, was scrutinised publicly which emphasised the personal accountability of decision makers. Poor intelligence prior to any conflict in the southern hemisphere would potentially lead to the same outcomes.
    Voters responded when Labours government lost the election in 2010, with a decline in electorate trust a contributing factor. Conversely, Thatcher gained popularity in her Britain-alone response seen in the Falklands, cementing the nickname 'Iron Lady' while seeing her landslide re-election in 1983 and 1987 following a conflict 8000 miles away from the UK but a beacon for political support. Both the Iraq and the Falkland conflicts were positioned as the defence of British security, but both had very different outcomes for politicians which influences their predecessors. The Royal Navy would encounter g...
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    13 mins
  • Hooper Prize - Second Place: Memes or Missiles
    Feb 5 2025
    Second Place
    LNN Esme Clayton, Joint Hospital Group
    Memes or missiles? Should we invest more in Information Operations?
    Definitions
    To be able to discuss this accurately, we need to first understand what the word 'meme' means. Although, it may be commonly associated by being coined by Richard Dawkins in The Selfish Gene (1976) as a 'unit' of culture. We can look for the meaning of the word further back in time all the way back to the Greeks, where they used the word 'minema' meaning 'imitated'. To think of the word simply it can be defined as a type of behaviour, picture, text, containing information which is passed from person to person.
    Missiles are easier to define as 'an object which is forcibly propelled at a target'.
    Memes - an extension of a much older concept?
    Firstly, to look into the benefits of investing more into information operations, it is useful to look at an example of its use in WW2. Operation Mincemeat, was a successful British operation where they deceived the Germans into thinking that the allies were planning to invade Greece and Sardinia, when the actual target was Sicily. They did this by planting fake correspondents into a corpse dressed as a Major. As you can see from this example, the British used both tactics and sensitive information, to manipulate the opponents plans. The Germans doubled the number of troops sent to Sardinia, allowing the allies to fully capture Sicily. Another example was at the D-Day landings when they used dummy tanks to distract the enemy, and suggested that the Allies would attack other places to weaken German forces in Normandy.
    This would be in favour of the use of information operations in warfare, as we can see that it is very difficult to decipher what is fact and what is fiction, especially in heightened stress situations such as war. With the ever increasing knowledge behind technology and artificial intelligence, it would be vital for the UK to invest further into this, as it is impossible to predict what it could be used for in the future.
    The importance of critical thinking and analysis
    However, we are also able to use this example as a disadvantage of information operations, as the Germans saw the corpse of a 'Major' and gathered the information about the British and used it to defend their country. Although, the difficulty lies when interpreting which information is useful and which has been staged. For the proper use of information operations you need three core elements - intelligence, leadership and information systems. Firstly intelligence, intelligence is ever changing and it is one of the most dynamic elements in wartime, so it needs to be acted upon with speed and accuracy, in order to get the desired outcome. A strong leader is needed to ensure that there is strong decision making, they are able to critically think and visualise the battlefield, to come up with the best options with the information gained. And finally, the ability to acquire, analyse and store the information that is obtained.
    And a limitation of the final element, is that the information can be leaked or hacked, showing the importance of the first two core elements, to allow the information to be acted on immediately. With the current funding the armed forces are struggling to find the correct people who are qualified and have the desired experience for the role. It is understandable that the best minds in artificial intelligence, computers and social media are attracted to the high salaries in multi-international companies. If they invested more into intelligence operations, I believe a large percentage of this investment should be utilised to train people to correctly use information operations, as well as to decipher between correct and incorrect information.
    Are Info Ops effective in a modern, media-savvy world?
    There is evidence to show that although information operations in warfare was effective in the past, however, now they are more well known and exposed, meaning that they ar...
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    10 mins
  • Sailing into Leadership: Analysis of "Master and Commander"
    Jan 31 2025
    One of the most remarkable literary achievements of the 20th century emerged in 1989 when W.W. Norton published Patrick O'Brian's multi-volume fictional re-creation of British naval life during the Napoleonic Wars. Eventually stretching to twenty books, O'Brian's account of the lives of Captain Jack Aubrey and his great friend, Doctor Stephen Maturin entranced reviewers and millions of readers. A reviewer from the New York Times stated that O'Brian's books are simply "the best historical novels ever written." "Master and Commander" is the first Hollywood movie made from O'Brian's books and what follows is not a review but rather an essay that uses the movie to frame a discussion of leadership. The focus is the character of Jack Aubrey- created by Patrick O'Brian, visualized by director Peter Weir and brought to life by actor Russell Crowe. An examination of Aubrey's behavior, thoughts and values throughout the movie provides a wealth of insight into the concept of leadership.
    As the movie begins, it is the spring of 1805 and we are aboard HMS Surprise, a small Royal Navy frigate with a crew of 197 souls and an armament of 28 guns. HMS Surprise serves as a tiny but exact mirror of the actual British navy and Jack Aubrey serves as an archetype of a fighting British sea-captain during the Napoleonic wars. As we will see, the movie title of "Master and Commander" is actually an incomplete description of Aubrey's role, which can more accurately be described as "Master, Commander and Leader." Each of these three roles describes a different aspect of Aubrey's performance. Each derives from a unique set of competencies but all three roles strongly complement each other. The fact that Aubrey is successful as master, commander and leader has a decisive effect on the course of events in the movie.
    HMS Surprise has left England under orders to find the French frigate Acheron and "sink, burn or take her as a prize." The Surprise is off the coast of Brazil and approaching a fogbank that seems to contain something suspicious. When the alarm is raised, we are introduced to Captain Jack Aubrey who peers into the fogbank, sees gunflashes and quickly realizes that the Surprise is about to be mauled by the larger, more heavily gunned enemy ship. Aubrey is energized by the prospect of combat ("straight at 'em, Mr. Mowatt!") but events quickly take a turn for the worse as Surprise's rudder is shot away and the British barely escape into the fog.
    We learn more of Aubrey in the wake of the Surprise's first disastrous encounter with the French. The ship's officers, somewhat in shock, are discussing the engagement and they observe that Acheron was "more like a ship of the line than a frigate" and "our shots couldn't penetrate." They all assume that the clear superiority of the French ship means the Surprise will have to abandon its mission and return to England. Their misgivings are well-founded. HMS Surprise, with 28 guns, is about as small as a ship can be and still be called a frigate. By way of comparison, the four British frigates that fought at Trafalgar were all armed with at least 36 guns. Jack Aubrey, however, sees the situation from a very different perspective. Positively radiating with decisiveness, he tells his officers that there is not a moment to lose if they are to carry out repairs and catch up with the French.
    As the ship recovers, we see an absolute beehive of complicated, intense activity; a visual reminder that warships of this period were the largest, most complex and deadliest moving objects in the world. In addition, these ships were a veritable "system of systems" and competent commanders had to know every aspect of their ship. We see Captain Aubrey talking gunnery with the gunner, navigation with the sailing master and ship repairs with the carpenter. Aubrey's obvious competence links to a leadership insight derived from Clausewitz. The Prussian philosopher of war once observed that great leaders need to be decisive but it...
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    16 mins
  • The Lt Cdr Hooper Essay Competition 2024 - A Fantastic Foursome!
    Jan 29 2025
    Giving our people a platform
    Here at The Wavell Room, our message has always been loud and consistent: critical thinking and writing is not (and should never be) just an 'officers' sport'. Professional development amongst the serving community must always be encouraged, and given the exceptional intelligence, insight and quality of our people their voices must be heard.
    To that end, it is an absolute pleasure to be able to announce that the Royal Navy has granted us permission to publish the best placed articles written for this year's edition of the Lt Cdr Hooper essay competition. This annual event is open to Junior Ratings and Other Ranks in all branches of the Royal Navy, Royal Marines, Royal Fleet Auxiliary and Maritime Reserves; including those holding acting higher rank (i.e. Substantive Leading Hand / Corporal and below).
    The Challenge
    Each year, three questions are offered up for analysis and response. This year, the titles on offer were:
    1. Memes or Missiles? Should we invest more in Information Operations?
    2. It is more than 40 years since the Falklands conflict. Evaluate the challenges the Royal Navy face if it was to engage in a non-UN/NATO supported conflict in the Southern hemisphere.
    3. Allyship in the Royal Navy. Why is it important and how is it going?
    Winners - 2024
    It was so tough to judge this year, that some extra prize money was rustled up to allow for a Joint 3rd Place finisher. BZ to all, and we at the Wavell Room very much hope that you enjoy their musings.
    First Place
    ET(ME) Joseph Hardiman - Essay 2
    Second Place
    Leading Naval Nurse Esme Clayton - Essay 1
    Third Place (Joint)
    AB David Dulla - Essay 2
    LH(EW) Lewis Batch - Essay 2
    The Lt Cdr Hooper Prize
    This annual essay competition commemorating the late Lt Cdr Geoffrey William Winsmore Hooper OBE RN is open to all Junior Ratings across the Royal Navy and aims to broaden current affairs knowledge. Prize money is provided from a trust fund established in 1952 by Lt Cdr Hooper's mother. Aged only 30, Geoffrey Hooper was killed in a motor accident 2nd January 1923 in Hong Kong.
    Anyone keen to enter the 2025 competition should look out for the relevant RNTM on the RN Intranet.
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    3 mins
  • Lt Cdr Hooper Prize - First Place
    Jan 29 2025
    First Prize Winner
    ET(ME) Joseph Hardiman, Disposal and Reserve Ships Organisation
    It is more than 40 years since the Falklands conflict. Evaluate the challenges the Royal Navy face if it was to engage in a non-UN/NATO supported conflict in the Southern hemisphere.
    The Challenge
    The Royal Navy faces significant challenges in engaging in a conflict in the Southern Hemisphere without UN/NATO interoperability and support. To ascertain the scope and gravity that underscores these challenges, this essay will focus upon identifying potential adversaries and the specific threats they pose to Britain. This analysis will not only highlight the viability of any hypothetical engagement but also underscore the critical nature of these threats. Secondly, addressing the lack of support is crucial. Although the possibility of forming sub alliances, as successfully done in past engagements, exists, and is explored through this essay, ultimately this scenario must be approached from a worst-case perspective. This methodology allows the Royal Navy to discern between its interoperability with NATO and its veritable shortcomings in both platform capability and lethality.
    Today, whilst the Royal Navy is exceptionally capable in certain areas it is too small to engage in conflicts at the scale it once could, and it cannot single-handedly meet the diverse threats emerging in an increasingly contested Southern Hemisphere.
    Non-traditional adversaries
    While it's important to note that the Royal Navy's primary adversaries lie in the Northern Hemisphere, namely Iran, China, and Russia, through careful analysis, it has become abundantly clear that the Southern Hemisphere presents a distinct set of challenges that the Royal Navy must rigorously evaluate to sustain its efficacy and lethality as a formidable fighting force. These encompass overseas British territories, inhabited by British subjects entitled to protection, as well as emerging threats from an increasingly contested region of the world. Firstly, the Falklands is still a significant point of contention for both Britain and Argentina. In 2013, a British-sanctioned referendum was conducted, which saw 99.8% of islanders voting to remain under British control. However, a poll conducted in the same year by YouGov, ascertained that only 15% of Argentinians shared the conviction of the British government, that the Islanders had a right to self-determination.
    This sentiment was tacitly reflected by the incumbent president Javier Milei, who in 2024 stated a desire to establish a clear "roadmap" to patriate the Falkland Islands into "Argentine hands." Although he emphasized that any pursuit would be through "diplomatic channels" the situation still presents tangible concern for Britain. Milei is a populist, whose mandate survives on catering to the wants and desires of the ordinary citizen. In a country that firmly believes the Falklands belong to them as evidenced further by their celebration of Las Malvinas day annually (Argentine name for the islands), the failure of diplomatic channels could lead Milei, much like Galtieri in 1982, to leverage an invasion of the Falklands to stoke Argentine nationalism.
    Global Threats
    While the Falkland Islands present the most tactile point of contention, it is important to underscore the issue of new emerging threats. These are evidenced by adversaries from the Northern Hemisphere intensifying their presence within the region both directly and indirectly, presenting political and economic threats to both the Royal Navy and Britain. Firstly, The Maritime Security Threat Advisory (MTSA) reported in 2024 that an Iranian vessel had entered the Southern Hemisphere, citing this as "the first" instance of this happening. This exemplifies a navy, once decimated by the United States in 1988, now exhibiting defiance and a growing confidence. It is increasingly willing to extend its influence into new regions, thereby presenting a burgeoning threat. To compound this further,...
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    12 mins