Losing the Long Game

The False Promise of Regime Change in the Middle East

By: Philip H. Gordon

Narrated by: Mark Deakins

The definitive account of how regime change in the Middle East has proven so tempting to American policymakers for decades - despite never achieving the far-reaching aims of its proponents - and how it's finally time to forge a new path forward.

Since the end of World War II, the United States has set out to oust governments in the Middle East on an average of once per decade - in places as diverse as Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan (twice), Egypt, Libya, and Syria. The reasons for these interventions have also been extremely diverse, and the methods by which the United States pursued regime change have also been highly varied, ranging from diplomatic pressure alone to outright military invasion and occupation. What is common to all the operations, however, is that they failed to achieve their ultimate goals, produced a range of unintended and even catastrophic consequences, carried heavy financial and human costs, and in many cases left the countries in question worse off than they were before.

Losing the Long Game is a thorough and riveting look at the US experience with regime change over the past 70 years and an insider's view on US policymaking in the region at the highest levels. It is the story of repeated US interventions in the region that always started out with high hopes and often the best of intentions, but never turned out well. No future discussion of US policy in the Middle East will be complete without taking into account the lessons of the past, especially at a time of intense domestic polarization and reckoning with America's standing in world.

©2020 Philip H. Gordon (P)2020 Random House Audio

Losing the long game in the Middle East

Good overview of US involvement in the ME. Highly recommended for understanding the reasons & lessons’ learned.

Highly recommended

Each chapter serves as a fascinating case study of American regime change. His analysis is thorough. I particularly enjoyed how he explored alternative options to the path chosen by the US in each case study. His experience in the Obama administration gives him tremendous insight into several of these situations. He’s honest about the fact that there are no easy solutions to any of these problems. Highly recommend!

No review possible

I have finished only first chapter, yet this stupid app insists on a review, so

Decent Book but Not Great

This is a decent book with good content but for some reason it feels fluffy. It seems pretty much like a long litany of complaints for invasions that have gone wrong but nothing really substantial. I don't know why bit that's my feeling. I would rather recommend "World Order" by Henry Kissinger. It feels much more complete. factual but also conceptual.

Good reflective analysis.

I wish it was more technical, and deconstructed the variables at play more quantitatively.

There are initial conditions that can wildly influence the outcomes, and intermediate steps that disallow the intended steady state solution from being implemented, of course. Anyone who takes PDE knows this. I would have liked to see less of a historical review, or at least if that review was to measurable use, so we readers can know what has been learned more in-depth from our extensive trial-and-error attempts at regime change. A pragmatic data-driven approach to this discussion would have been more fruitful to me, personally. The predictions for such a model should reflect the failures seen in the middle east while also pointing to promise in other cases where we saw successful regime change. I think going into what an unstable equilibrium looks like (regime overthrow, then chaos) in comparison to whether slow and steady nudges of influence used to reach a non-ideal equilibrium, (that can slowly be shifted over decades, possibly, to a more ideal state) is feasible (why/why not) would be a useful discussion for newbies like me. Just as a general comment, I personally would have benefited more from this reading had alternative strategies been discussed more fully. Why and why not other ways of encouraging positive associations with the American outsiders are implemented (and why they should/shouldn’t be) (e.g., taking a genuine interest into the needs of the region and making steps to supplying whatever it is to fill those needs and/or supplying opportunities for residents to implement it themselves like what can be done a bit in Africa).