In this month’s podcast, the trio discusses three new Seventh Circuit decisions. First, Kian takes a deep dive into a fractured en banc decision on an unusual qualified immunity issue. Next, Lara gets philosophical with a case that raises the question of whether an Indian tribe can be a Section 1983 plaintiff — but definitely doesn’t answer it! To round out the program, Mark addresses a decision on who decides when litigation conduct constitutes a waiver of the right to arbitrate. No spoilers, except to say that in Judge Easterbrook’s own words, “it has nothing to do with mootness.”

Kian, Lara and Mark take on a new batch of key Seventh Circuit cases in this month’s podcast. First, the three discuss the Court’s en banc decision in U.S. v. Page, in which the Court changed the standard for proving conspiracy to distribute in drug cases and limited the availability of plain error review for jury instructions. Second, Lara takes on the constitutional limits on punitive damages in an interesting new trademark case. Finally, Kian (aka “Mr. Jurisdiction”) explains two recent jurisdictional cases, one involving a vacatur of a stay that destroyed appellate jurisdiction and one holding that the lack of Article III standing requires remanding a removed case, not dismissing it.

In this special episode, Mark and Kian welcome a third member to the podcast team – Lara Langeneckert, commercial litigator at Barnes & Thornburg and formerly of the Indiana Solicitor General’s Office and the Southern District of Indiana U.S. Attorney’s Office.

The team begins with a labor law extravaganza, discussing three significant cases under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA): Jacks v. DirectSat, Acevedo v. Professional Transportation, and Walters v. Professional Labor Group. These cases address the requirements for (and distinctions between) class actions and collective actions under the FLSA, as well as the FLSA’s rules for when employers must compensate employees for commuting time.

The episode concludes with United States v. House, which explores whether the Fourth Amendment requires the police to obtain a warrant before using a pole camera (i.e., a video camera affixed to a utility pole) to observe a suspect’s home.