Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife

Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam

De: John A. Nagl, General Peter J. Schoomaker

Narrado por: John Pruden

Invariably, armies are accused of preparing to fight the previous war. In Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, Lieutenant Colonel John A. Nagl—a veteran of both Operation Desert Storm and the conflict in Iraq—considers the now crucial question of how armies adapt to changing circumstances during the course of conflicts for which they are initially unprepared. Through the use of archival sources and interviews with participants in both engagements, Nagl compares the development of counterinsurgency doctrine and practice in the Malayan Emergency from 1948 to 1960 with what developed in the Vietnam War from 1950 to 1975.

In examining these two events, Nagl argues that organizational culture is key to the ability to learn from unanticipated conditions, a variable which explains why the British army successfully conducted counterinsurgency in Malaya and why the American army failed to do so in Vietnam, treating the war instead as a conventional conflict. Nagl concludes that the British army, because of its role as a colonial police force and the organizational characteristics created by its history and national culture, was better able to quickly learn and apply the lessons of counterinsurgency during the course of the Malayan Emergency.

With a new preface reflecting on the author’s combat experience in Iraq, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knifeis a timely examination of the lessons of previous counterinsurgency campaigns that will be hailed by both military leaders and interested civilians.

Lieutenant Colonel John A. Nagl, US Army (Ret.), is a military assistant to the deputy secretary of defense. He led a tank platoon in the First Cavalry Division in Operation Desert Storm, taught national security studies at West Point’s Department of Social Sciences, and served as the operations officer of Task Force 1-34 Armor with the First Infantry Division in Khalidiyah, Iraq.

©2002 John A. Nagl. Preface 2005 by John A. Nagl. Foreword 2005 by Peter J. Schoomaker. Additional material by the University of Chicago Press (P)2012 Blackstone Audio, Inc.

Reseñas de la Crítica

“[A] highly regarded counterinsurgency manual.” ( Washington Post)

“Colonel Nagl’s book is one of a half dozen Vietnam histories—most of them highly critical of the US military in Vietnam—that are changing the military’s views on how to fight guerrilla wars…The tome has already had an influence on the ground in Iraq.” ( Wall Street Journal)

“ Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife (a title taken from T. E. Lawrence—himself no slouch in guerrilla warfare) is a study of how the British Army succeeded in snuffing out the Malayan insurgency between 1948 and 1960—and why the Americans failed in Vietnam…It is helping to transform the American military in the face of its greatest test since Vietnam.” ( Times (London))

Unique and Captivating

The book presents a good account of the British in Malaya and the US Army in Vietnam. John made an interesting comparism, intelligently relating the surface/visible differences to critical yet non-obvious factors such as organizational cultures. John describes generally, the behaviors of armies and the difficulty faced in changing an army’s doctrine. He also proffers solutions to assist in overcoming the challenges. Captivating read also. I recommend.

Lessons we still haven't learned for 500 Alex

Lethality is important but so is understanding your operational environment. If the Army cannot learn to adapt to the political nature of war (whether in LSCO or COIN) than the Army will continue to flounder in foreign conflict. A good read that should be discussed more in military circles. Large scale combat operations and counter insurgency operations are not mutually exclusive. The military needs to be prepared for both.

Eurocentric

This is a very neccessary subject of study and there were good observations noted. Most importantly the need to adapt and be always learning as an organization. I believe the examples were primarily from a Eurocentric perspective on warfare.

Interesting topic but dry

I was looking for something that went more into the tactics involved in counter insurgency and their application. This book is more of a high level overview of the development of tactics without much time wasted on what those tactics were.

Great book

Great book but I think one crucial element is missing. The authors claim that the civilian structure of the U.S. that engaged with the military to prosecute the war was free of the self imposed limitations that prevented the military from becoming a learning organization. However, it is well documented that civilian ideas injected into the war hindered the war effort not helped. The most obvious examples are presidential decisions to halt and restart then halt and restart strategic bombing campaigns.

learning to eat soup with a knife

such a easy to comprehend history of the art of war . this covers different countries eras wars & conflicts from both sides and the evolution of the mind of warfare

How to make military action and political effort match

A must read for every officer, civil servant or educated amateur who searches for a deeper understanding of COIN.
This book is more important than ever for those dealing with ISIS, Al Nuzra, Al-Qaeda, etc. in places like Lybia, Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan but also for countering separatism in Eastern Ukraine.

Informative, but not totally reliable.

When you say counter insurgency to the Army, the Army recoils like a Vegan from a hamburger.

Yet why is that? And what can be done to change it? The first answer is that "it's due as much to the culture of the Army as it is to chance. The second answer is that the Army has to have a desire and a willingness to change otherwise they will always lose"

The gist is that Malaysia was a lucky break for England and Vietnam was a highly controversial and complex problem for which the Army sought a simple and straightforward solution and failed.

That is the book in a nutshell.

The US and England have a long history of ridged thinking and the idea that England just spontaneously decided to adapt and learn is absurd. England got lucky, the Malaysians liked them and hated the Chinese, in Vietnam the locals disliked the US and feared the VC.

It's a great read if you're interested in why the US Army stubbornly refused to adapt to the war it was fighting and admits that there is no way to explain why some Armed forces adapt and others do not, but like so many other such books is too convinced that "if we had just done this or that, we would have won."

Great book - read by Siri's brother

The lessons from Vietnam and the Malayan conflict are clear and very well put together. I was surprised at the end that the book was actually narrated by a human - I could have sworn it was a robot.

Informative and sobering.

Nagle was ahead of the times. Thank goodness men like him, along with Generals Petraeus, Franks, Mattis and McChrystal. Along with Admiral McRaven. The right people at the right time. This book and the narrator were excellent.